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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v,

:

MICHAEL B. QUICK,

:

Case No. 940083-CA

Category No- 2

Defendant/Appellant. :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for attempted
murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-203 (Cum. Supp. 1994), in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond
S. Uno, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's

motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence?
A trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial on
the basis of newly discovered evidence is reviewed for "abuse of
discretion" or "reasonability."
545 (Utah 1994);

State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540,

State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991);

State v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah App. 1990).

2.

Did the trial court properly allow the victim to

display the location of his injuries to the jury under rule 403,
Utah Rules of Evidence?
A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence
under rule 4 03, Utah Rules of Evidence, is also reviewed for
"abuse of discretion" or "reasonability."

State v. White, No.

930696-CA, slip op. at 4 (Utah App. August 17, 1994); State v.
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992).

See also State v.

Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5-6 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman,
846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and
rules are set forth in Addendum A.Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Cum. Supp. 1994)
Utah R. Evid. 4 03
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with attempted murder, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Cum.
Supp. 1994) (R. 8). A jury found defendant guilty (R. 77-78,
144-45).

On October 18, 1993, defendant was sentenced to the

Utah State Prison for a term of one to fifteen years, with a
consecutive zero to five year firearm enhancement, in addition to
fines, fees, and restitution (R. 149-50).
his conviction.
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Defendant now appeals

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Shooting

Defendant shot Frank Connelly three times while Frank
was sitting in a vehicle in front of the Pax Company, where
defendant worked (R. 405-10, 428-32) .
A few months before, defendant had arrived in Salt Lake
City and rented a room under the name of James Morris (R. 24 0-44,
693).

Two weeks later, to save money, defendant moved into a

room with Terry Stevens (R. 245, 254-55).

Defendant stole

Terry's social security card, birth certificate, and
identification card (R. 256-57, 371-74, 738-42), and used Terry's
identity to obtain a driver's license, a post office box, and
employment as a laborer with Pax Company (R. 267-68, 281-85, 299,
321-24, 738-42).
Still using Terry Stevens' name, defendant set up an
elaborate scam.

He placed an advertisement in local newspapers

which stated:
VICE PRESIDENT. Fortune 500 company seeks
prominent individual for Vice-President of
Sales. Management of 500-plus employees in
72 offices in United States and abroad. Must
be able to make decisions that involve
millions of dollars in contracts for the
company. This person must be able to deal
with high-ranking military personnel and
government officials. Extensive travel
abroad for the first year. Position includes
six-figure income, stock options, 401K,
medical and dental, company car, expense
account, use of company plane. Candidate
must possess a four-year degree, minimum five
years sales experience, five years management
in sales or marketing. Must be able to pass
background and credit investigation.
3

(R. 219-20, 333, 336-37, 340, 703-4).

Defendant claimed his plan

was to attract well-to-do persons with the advertisement, offer
them the phony job, charge them $2 00 for a "security
investigation," and pocket the money (R. 703-4).
At least two people responded to the ad.

One was Diane

Poland, who received a call a couple of weeks after she had sent
in her resume (R. 345-46).

She was told to come to the Little

America Hotel in Salt Lake at 9:00 or 9:30 a.m. on March 1, 1993
(R. 347). She met with defendant, who gave her a business card
with the name "T. L. Stevens," interviewed her in detail and gave
her the impression she might be hired, not for the advertised
job, but for a related position (R. 348-54, 704-5).

He said he

would call her the following Wednesday, but she never heard from
him again (R. 354, 356).
At approximately 11:00 a.m., as Ms. Poland was leaving,
Frank Connelly, who had also responded to the ad, was arriving
for his interview with "T. L. Stevens" (R. 355, 359, 385-87, 7045, 709). Connelly had worked for 25 years in sporting goods
marketing and management, and was in the process of leaving
Allied Development Company after four and a half years as General
Merchandise Manager (R. 382-83, 424-25, 450-51).

Connelly's

interview with defendant was similar to Ms. Poland's (R. 390-93).
Defendant called him later that day and told him he had the job
(R. 394) . Defendant further requested that Connelly drive him
out to the airport that night (R. 395).
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At 7:00 p.m., Connelly picked up defendant at the hotel
(R. 3 98).

Defendant requested they stop off at Pax Company,

where he claimed he had left some papers (R. 3 95, 4 02).
When Connelly stopped in front of the Pax building,
defendant began to exit the passenger door, turned around, and
shot Connelly (R. 402-5).

The first bullet hit Connelly's right

arm, shattering his elbow (R. 405, 522). The second struck him
in the top of the head, as he was leaning toward the passenger
door (R. 406-7, 483-84).

He then used his left hand to retrieve

a gun he carried in an ankle holster (R. 408-9).x

When

defendant saw Connelly's gun, he fired a third time, backed away,
and apparently ran off (R. 4 09-11).

The third shot entered

Connelly's right breast and exited from the lower left stomach
area (R. 410, 522). Connelly fell out of the vehicle through the
passenger door, got up and circled to the driver's door, and
drove the vehicle to a service station, where the police were
called (R. 411, 415-16).
At various points during his testimony, Connelly showed
the jury the scars from the bullet wounds (R. 407, 420, 428-30).
When he was asked to undo his shirt to show the abdominal scars,
defense counsel objected, but the court allowed the jury to see

Connelly's gun had a clip loaded with five rounds, but
required a two-handed cocking action before it would fire. Because
his right elbow was shattered, he was not able to cock or fire it
(R. 410) . Testing showed that neither the bullet removed from
Connelly nor the three empty casings found at the scene were fired
by his gun (R. 591-94, 600).
5

the location of those scars as well (R. 428-30, 444-45, Addendum
C) .
B.

Motion for New Trial

After the trial, defendant discovered that a fill-inthe-blank form dated June 3, 1993, titled "Application for
Hearing," had been filed with the Utah Industrial Commission
nearly three months before defendant's trial (R. 866-68).

The

form was signed by Connelly and, where it requests a description
of the "accident and resulting injuries," the following statement
is typed, "I was shot three (3) timeswhile [sic] interviewing
with some people as part of my job with Allied" (R. 162; the form
is attached as Addendum B ) .
On its face the form appears to seek reimbursement for
medical expenses (R. 162, Addendum B ) .

Connelly had no need of

such reimbursement, because his medical expenses were all covered
by his insurance and Utah victim reparations (R. 872).

Connelly

was unsure of what the form was for, knowing only that it was
some paperwork sent to him for his signature by Allied
Developement, his former employer (R. 872-73, 875).
The form was signed by, and apparently prepared by
Lester A. Perry, an attorney for Allied (R. 162, 872, Addendum
B).

The blanks were filled in by a typewriter and an "x" was

handwritten in the space where Connelly was to sign (R. 162,
Addendum B ) .

The document was mailed to Connelly, and he,

expecting a paper from Allied, signed it without reading it very
carefully (it also contained an incorrect birthdate for Connelly,
6

which he did not notice) and sent it back the same day (R. 87275) .
After learning of the form, defendant moved for a new
trial, asserting that this newly discovered evidence was a prior
inconsistent statement by which he could have "impeach ted] the
credibility of . . . Connelly" and obtained a different verdict
(R. 156-58).

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court

denied the motion (R. 865, 899-902).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for
a new trial, because the newly discovered evidence was cumulative
and, at most, merely tended to impeach or discredit a witness,
and because it would not render a different result probable if
the case were retried.
The trial court properly allowed the victim to show the
jury the scars from his wounds.

The scars were probative to show

the precise location of the wounds and were not gruesome or
unfairly prejudicial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE
BASIS OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS
PROPERLY DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for
a new trial, because the newly discovered evidence was
cumulative, merely tended to impeach or discredit a witness, and
would not render a different result probable on retrial.
7

As noted above, the denial of a motion for a new trial
on the basis of newly discovered evidence is reviewed for abuse
of discretion or reasonability.

State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540,

545 (Utah 1994) (a decision "within the limits of reasonability"
will be upheld); State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991)
("[w]e assume that the trial court exercised proper discretion
unless the record clearly shows the contrary"); see also State v.
Becker. 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah App. 1990).
The substantive test for granting a new trial on the
basis of newly discovered evidence, set forth in State v.
Gellatly, 449 P.2d 993 (Utah 1969), requires the new evidence to
meet three criteria:

"(1) It must be such as could not with

reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the
trial; (2) it must not be merely cumulative; (3) it must be such
as to render a different result probable on the retrial of the
case."

Id. at 995-96; see also James, 819 P.2d at 793.

Furthermore, when new evidence "merely tends to impeach or
discredit the testimony of a witness, . . .
be granted."

a new trial need not

Becker, 803 P.2d at 1294; see also State v.

Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988); Baker v. State. 755 P.2d
493, 501 (Kan. 1988).
While the application form could not, "with reasonable
diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial,"
defendant failed, in the hearing below, to establish any of the
other requirements for granting a new trial.
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The "new" evidence

is merely cumulative, it merely tends to impeach a witness, and
it would not likely cause a different verdict on retrial.
A.

The Evidence is Merely Cumulative

The application form signed by Connelly is merely
cumulative of defense counsel's several attempts to impeach
Connelly by pointing out minor arguable inconsistencies in his
prior statements.
1.

Examples of those attempts follow:

Defense counsel tried to impeach Connelly's

testimony that he had lived in Alaska for several weeks by
referring to his preliminary hearing testimony that he had
"always lived in Salt Lake City" (R. 447-48).
2.

Defense counsel tried to impeach Connelly's

testimony that his vehicle was not in "park" when the first shot
was fired by referring to his preliminary hearing testimony that
he was "about to put the car in park" (R. 471-72).
3.

Defense counsel tried to impeach Connelly's

testimony that defendant had said "This is it" just prior to
firing the first shot by referring to Connelly's failure to
relate those words in his preliminary hearing testimony (R. 47374) .
4.

Defense counsel tried to impeach Connelly's

testimony that the lower part of his arm was capable of moving
after being shot by referring to his preliminary hearing
testimony that his "right arm was basically useless" (R. 475).
5.

Defense counsel tried to impeach Connelly's

testimony regarding how far out of the vehicle defendant's body
9

was when he fired the last shot by referring to his preliminary
hearing testimony on that subject (R. 478-80).
In each instance, either defense counsel's attack on
Connelly appeared to be inconsequential, or Connelly gave a
reasonable explanation for the difference in his statements.
Similarly, in the post-trial hearing the trial court found that
Connelly gave a reasonable explanation for the minor inaccuracies
in the application form (R. 901, Addendum D). 2
Had the application form been available at trial, it's
effect would have been merely cumulative.

It would likely have

been viewed as simply another attempt, among many by defense
counsel, to attack Connelly's veracity with an apparent, minor
inconsistency.

Accordingly, the discovery of this document does

not justify a new trial.
B.

The Evidence Merely Tends to Impeach a Witness

The application form in the present case, at most,
merely tends to impeach Connelly.
discovered evidence in Becker.

It is similar to the newly

There, criminal charges were

filed against both Becker and Dalton.

Dalton testified against

Becker in his criminal trial. After trial, Becker discovered
that Dalton and the victims had entered a settlement agreement
prior to Becker's trial, wherein several civil claims against
Dalton were dismissed.

While recognizing that "the settlement

agreement, if known to Becker at trial, could have been
2

The trial court found that the form was prepared by someone
else, and that Connelly had signed it without carefully checking
its contents for accuracy (R. 900-01, Addendum D ) .
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appropriately explored in an effort to impeach Dalton's
credibility," Becker, 803 P.2d at 1294, this Court noted that
when new evidence "merely tends to impeach or discredit the
testimony of a witness, as here, a new trial need not be
granted."

Id. at 1294.
The supreme court has recognized the same principle.

E.g., James, 819 P.2d at 794 ("the refusal to grant a new trial
based merely on evidence of credibility will generally not be
overturned on appeal"); Worthen, 765 P.2d at 851 ("newly
discovered impeachment evidence does not ordinarily warrant a new
trial").
It is important to understand the difference between
this principle and the holding in the James case relied upon by
defendant.

There, where James was charged with first degree

murder of his son, evidence surfaced after trial that a key
witness had fabricated his testimony that he heard James confess
to having killed the boy.

The court found that evidence to be of

a different quality than "merely cumulative" or "merely
credibility" evidence, because it showed that the witness "had
deliberately committed perjury" on a crucial issue.

James, 819

P.2d at 794.
The statement on the application form in the present
case is completely different than the evidence in James for the
following reasons:

(1) the statement on the application form was

prepared by a third person and was not Connelly's direct
statement; (2) there was no admission of perjury or intent to
11

commit perjury; (3) the trial court found that Connelly gave a
reasonable explanation for having signed the statement; and (4)
the statement, even if believed, still supports Connelly's trial
testimony and refutes defendant's testimony.3

The statement is

more comparable to the settlement agreement in Becker;

it could

have been used in a general attack on credibility, but is not a
matter "sufficiently persuasive that the result of the trial
might be changed."

Becker. 803 P.2d at 1294.

Because the statement on the application form is the
type of new evidence that merely tends to impeach, and is not of
the caliber of the evidence in James, it does not justify a new
trial.
C. The New Evidence Would Not Cause a Different Result
on Retrial
The trial court, having heard the evidence presented
both at trial and in the motion for a new trial, weighed that
evidence and found that the outcome of the case "would not be
different with the additional information" (R. 901, Addendum D ) .
"[R]ecogniz[ing] the trial court's advantaged position in judging
credibility and resolving evidentiary conflicts," State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993), appellate courts

3

Defendant claims that the statement in the application form
was "not merely cumulative but was independent evidence which
corroborated [Quick's] statements." Br. of App. at 14. In fact,
the opposite is true. Connelly testified that defendant shot him
in conjunction with a job-related interview. Defendant claimed
that there was no interview, rather that he and Connelly were
negotiating an illegal drug sale when the shooting occurred (R.
706-07, 710-11).
The written statement corroborates the jobrelated interview version, not the drug sale story.
12

"assume that the trial court exercised proper discretion [in
determining whether newly discovered evidence merits a new trial]
unless the record clearly shows the contrary."

James, 819 P.2d

at 793.
The record supports the trial court's conclusion.
While the outcome of the case depended on whether the jury
believed Connelly or defendant, Connelly's testimony was amply
corroborated by other witnesses, and defendant's was not.
Furthermore, defendant admitted to the jury that he had been
convicted of forgeries and frauds (R. 696), that he had used
several false names (R. 693, 697-98, 733, 735, 737-38, 777-78),
and that he had set up "scams" or "cons" (R. 703-04, 708, 731,
835-36).

In short, defendant's credibility with the jury was

highly suspect.4
Defendant's account of the shooting was that, while he
had set up the job interview scam, he did not perpetrate that
scam on Connelly.

Rather, he maintained that, during a drug deal

with Connelly and Connelly's "partner" involving the sale of
thirty pounds of marijuana for $39,000, Connelly unexpectedly
drew a gun and tried to shoot defendant (R. 766-67).
partner also drew and fired a gun (R. 769-70).

4

Connelly's

However, alone

Even defense counsel, in closing argument, recognized
defendant's story was not believable. Counsel told the jury
can probably understand that from hearing [defendant] testify,
articulate, he's bright. Do you think if he was lying to you,
making up a story, he couldn't come up with something better
this?" (R. 836).
13

that
"you
he's
just
than

and unarmed, defendant escaped without injury, while Connelly was
inexplicably shot by his partner three times (R. 770-72).
This story was not corroborated by a single witness.
No evidence corroborates the existence of the 3 0 pounds of
marijuana (R. 723), the $39,000 (R. 722), the existence of
defendant's co-conspirators in the alleged drug deal (R. 705-06,
744-46, 752-54), the mysterious partner supposedly accompanying
Connelly (even though defendant and Connelly were seen together
minutes before the shooting) (R. 717, 504-06), or defendant's
alleged "numerous" other meetings with Connelly (R. 707).
On the other hand, Connelly's assertion that he was
shot in connection with interviewing for a job with defendant,
posing as "T. L. Stevens," is confirmed by several sources.
Perhaps the most significant is defendant's own admission that he
was, in fact, posing as "T. L. Stevens" and was running a job
interview scam from the Little America Hotel, where he also met
with Connelly (R. 703-05, 711, 758-59, 738-39).

Also striking is

that Connelly just happened to need a new job and just happened
to have the sales and marketing experience specified in the phony
advertisement (R. 219-20, 381-84, 703-04), as is defendant's
statement to Diane Poland that he was about to interview a man
(whom he admitted at trial was Connelly) for the job (R. 355-56,
753-56) .
Connelly's assertion that he was interviewed by
defendant for a job is further supported by the similarity in the
details of his interview and Diane Poland's interview with
14

defendant immediately prior.

Both Connelly and Poland reported

that the interviews were "long," nearly two hours (352, 359,
3 90); both stated defendant claimed to be with Monsanto Chemical
Company (R. 347, 353-54, 385); both were told they would have to
do training in St. Louis, Missouri (R. 350, 354-55, 392, 395);
defendant mentioned an interest in expensive cars to both (R.
352, 391A); and both were told they would have to pass a security
check (R. 359, 393) .
Had Connelly been making up the job interview, his
account of the interview could not have coincided in such detail
with Ms. Poland's account.
Additionally, in Connelly's several statements to
police officers immediately after being shot, he consistently
told the officers he had been shot by a "T. L. Stevens," who had
interviewed him for a job at Little America Hotel, while driving
the person to a business on the way to the airport (R. 515-17,
533-35, 671-74) .

These statements were consistent with his trial

testimony.
Finally, Connelly's account of how the shooting
occurred was consistent with the physical evidence at the scene
(blood spatters, empty shell casings, his clothing, and the
location of the wounds) (R. 407, 411-14, 418-21, 423-24, 428-30,
519-20, 531-33, 537-40, 559-63, 566-67, 583-84, 588, 590-91, 594,
597, 600, 614, 687-88).
In the face of such a divergence in credibility and
corroboration, the trial court was correct in holding that the
15

minor inaccuracies in the document typed by a third person would
not have produced a different verdict on retrial. Accordingly,
defendant's motion for a new trial was properly denied.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE
VICTIM TO SHOW THE JURY THE LOCATION OF HIS
INJURIES
The precise location of Connelly's wounds was probative
to corroborate his account of how he was positioned when the
shooting occurred.

Because the scars were not gruesome or

otherwise unfairly prejudicial, showing them to the jury was
proper under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Even had it been

improper for the jury to see the scars, the error was harmless.
A.

Standard of Review

A trial court's admission of evidence under rule 4 03
will be overturned only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion.
State v. White, No. 930696-CA, slip op. at 4 (Utah App. August
17, 1994).

This means that the trial court has "considerable

freedom in applying [Rule 4 03] to the facts, freedom to make
decisions which appellate judges might not make themselves ab
initio but will not reverse," Id. (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 937 (Utah 1994), unless the ruling "was beyond the limits of
reasonability."

Id. (citing State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep.

23, 28 (Utah 1994); Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239-40).
B.

The Rule 403 Balancing Test

The record does not indicate that the victim's scars
were gruesome, or that they were of such a nature as to provoke
16

an emotional response or otherwise cause unfair prejudice. At
any rate, the probative value of the jury viewing the precise
location of the victim's injuries outweighed any potential for
unfair prejudice.
Rule 4 03, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides for the
exclusion of evidence "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."

This occurs when

the evidence has an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis [such as] an emotional one," State v. Maurer, 770
P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989) (quoting M. Graham, Handbook of Federal
Evidence § 403.1, at 178 (2d ed. 1986)), or "appeals to the
jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, [or] provokes its
instinct to punish."

Id. (quoting Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d

961, 972-73 (3rdCir. 1986)).
Prejudicial Effect.

Defendant concedes that Connelly's

scars do not fit into any of the categories of evidence having an
"unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead
the jury."

Br. of App. at 19-20 (quoting State v. DiBello. 780

P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989)).

Thus, "the usual Rule 403 analysis

applies, and a presumption exists that the evidence is
admissible."

White, slip op. at 6; State v. Moore. 788 P.2d 525,

527 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990);
DiBello, 780 P.2d at 1229.
Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that
Connelly's wounds were disfiguring, grotesque, or otherwise
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likely to provoke an emotional response such as horror or pity.
There has been no showing of a significant prejudicial effect.
Probative Value.

The location of the scars,

particularly those in the abdomen, was highly probative of the
direction of travel of the shots.

This was important

corroboration of Connelly's testimony of his position at the time
of the second and third shots, which testimony was highly
disputed by defendant.
Defendant's theory was that Connelly was lying about
who shot him and how it occurred.

To support this, defense

counsel cross-examined Connelly repeatedly and extensively about
the position of his body when each shot was fired (R. 476-80,
483-89, 491-93, 496-97), then asserted in closing argument that
the angle of the shots, as judged from the wounds, was
inconsistent with Connelly's testimony (R. 826-28, 838, Addendum
C) .
The general location of Connelly's wounds was
established by other witnesses, but none of those witnesses took
exact measurements or made diagrams from which angles could be
computed, nor did they give opinions or conclusions as to the
probable angle of the shots (R. 512, 520-22, 532). To make those
assessments, it was important for the jury to see the scars of
the entry and exit wounds, particularly those for the abdominal
bullet.

Only then could the jury properly evaluate defense

counsel's claims that the angle was "really not consistent at all
with" Connelly's testimony (R. 826, Addendum C ) , and that "[i]t's
18

just not physically possible.

It just doesn't match what

[Connelly] said" (R. 828, Addendum C).
C.

Harmless Error

Even had the jury's viewing of Connelly's scars
constituted error, it was harmless. An error is harmful only
"when a reasonable likelihood exists that absent the error, the
result would have been more favorable to the defendant," Whrte,
slip op. at 8 (quoting DiBello, 780 P.2d at 1230), or when the
court's "confidence in the outcome is undermined."

Id.

The following factors contribute to the conclusion that
the error, if any, was harmless:
1.

The noninflammatory nature of the scars;

2.

The evidence of Connelly's wounds was not exploited

or even emphasized by the State; White, slip op. at 9 (potential
for prejudice was minimized by State's choice not to unduly
emphasize or otherwise misuse the evidence); State v. Valdez, 748
P.2d 1050, 1055 (Utah 1987) (any arguable error was harmless
because of the "noninflammatory nature of the pictures and the
lack of emphasis given them by the State");
3.

Connelly's head and neck wounds were apparently

already visible to the jury, and the head wound had previously
been pointed out to the jury without objection (R. 4 07); DiBello,
780 P.2d at 1230 (balancing the prejudicial effect of a gruesome
video against the fact that the jury saw three other gruesome
photographs whose admission was not appealed, the court saw no
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reasonable likelihood of a different result absent the video);
and
4.

The strength of the State's case against defendant,

as evidenced by the plethora of corroboration for Connelly's
testimony and the lack of corroboration of defendant's story,
discussed in Point I above.
The location and angle of Connelly's wounds may well
have helped convince the jury that his testimony was believable,
but the display of the scars to the jury did not cause the case
to be decided on an emotional or other improper basis.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for
a new trial and properly allowed the display of the victim's
scars to the jury.

Accordingly, this Court should affirm

defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /3t>

day of September,

1994.
JAN GRAHAM
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Assistant Attorney General

20

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed by first class mail
to RONALD S. FUJINO, attorney for appellant, 424 East 500 South,
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this /3lSSeptember, 1994.

21

day of

ADDENDUM A

76-5-203. Murder.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the
death of another;
(c) acting
under
circumstances
evidencing
a
depraved
indifference to human life engages in conduct which creates a grave
risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of another;
(d) while in the commission, attempted commission, or
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of
aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, object rape, forcible sodomy, or
aggravated sexual assault, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated
burglary, burglary, aggravated kidnapping, kidnapping,
child
kidnapping, rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a
child, forcible sexual abuse, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated
sexual abuse of a child, or child abuse, as defined in Subsection
76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 14 years of age,
causes the death of another person other than a party as defined in
Section 76-2-202; or
(e) causes the death of a peace officer while in the
commission or attempted commission of:
(i) an assault against a peace officer as defined in
Section 76-5-102.4; or
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a
lawful arrest as defined in Section 76-8-305 if the actor uses
force against a peace officer.
(2) Murder is a first degree felony.
Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice,
confusion # or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
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1

BY MR. STOTT:

2

Q.

Let me ask you this.

I'm going to ask you

3

to step down over by the jury again, one more time.

4

you come down here?

Can

5

A.

Sure.

6

Q*

Why don't you take off your jacket, would

7

you please.

8

off there, and I'll ask you to loosen your tie and your

9

shirt.

10

A*

11

Q.

12

(The witness complied.)
Okay.

19

Your Honor, may we approach the

bench before we proceed further with this?
THE COURT: Yes.

16

18

Would you step over here so the jury

MS. REMAL:

15

17

(Bench conference.)
BY MR. STOTT:
Q*

First of all, I don't know.

roll this up at all?
A.

Yeah.

21 I

Q.

Now, step over here.

22

your right arm out.

23

the right arm.

25

A*

Are you able to

Do you need some help?

20

24

Just pull that one

can see.

13
14

I can hold it for you.

I believe you have

Would you show the jury what was on

That's —

entered my right arm.

this is the point which the bullet
It's about an inch and a half
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below my shoulder.

2

Q.

What injury was caused to your right arm?

3

A.

My arm was broken.

4

Q.

Did it take very long for that to heal?

5

A.

It's still healing.

Shattered, actually.

I have about 80

6

percent, 75 or 80 percent use of that.

7

created a lot of shocks, so I lost a lot of muscle

8

tissue and the bone has healed just slightly crooked.

9

But it's -- they tell me it will be a year or so before

10
11
12

The bullet

I have what I'll get back, about 90 percent of that one.
Q.

Do you know if the bullet is still in

there?

13

A.

Yes, it is.

14

Q.

They didn't remove it?

15

A.

No, sir.

16

Q.

So you still have the bullet?

17

A.

Yes, sir.

18

Q.

Now, while you're facing the jury, can you

19
20

show us on your head?
A.

What can you show us?

The bullet entered right there below my

21

temple and traveled down my neck.

I was twisted over in

22

the seat, as I said, and the bullet traveled down my

23

neck rather than into my brain and exited —

24

a little hole there -- and then reentered and lodged

25

against my clavicle, and that's the bullet that they got

you can see
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out*
Q.

That bullet was removed from you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, this may be a little harder.

Are you

able to show us where the abdomen wound Is?
A#

Yeah.

It's not that —

Q.

Come over here.

I apologize, ladles.

I don't know If they can

see from right there.
A.
here.

That round entered here and then exited over

As I said, I was rather sideways in the seat, and

it went here, and that's where they took it out, and
so -MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, may the record

reflect in the process of speaking Mr. Connelly rolled
up the right sleeve of his arm and was pointing to the
scars as he was describing them, and that he unbuttoned
the front of his shirt down to the waist and
demonstrated to the jurors and pointed to the scars that
-- to the scars that he was alluding to there.
THE COURT:

Yes.

The record will reflect

MR. STOTT:

To the entry wounds, your Honor,

that.

and to the exit wounds.
Thank you.
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a recess for lunch till 1:30.

So if you can be back

here before 1:30 so we can reassemble and proceed with
the rest of the case.
We'll be in recess till 1:30.
Just the admonition, again, please do not
talk to anybody or get exposed to anything regarding
this case.

Little America is just a little over there,

and don't walk over there to eat today or during the
course of this trial.
(Luncheon recess.)
THE COURT:

There are some matters that Ms.

Remal would like to put on the record, so we will do so
at this time.
MS. REMAL:

That's correct, your Honor.

This morning when Mr. Connelly was testifying, I asked
for an opportunity for Mr. Stott and I to approach the
bench.

That was just at the time that Mr. Stott had

asked Mr. Connelly to step down in front of the jury.
And I expected that what he was going to ask
was exactly what he did ask, and that is that Mr.
Connelly unbutton his shirt and show the scars from the
wounds that he received.

We approached the bench so

that I could make my objection at that time to you and
indicated that in my view that was objectionable,
because it was more prejudicial than probative.
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1

And I didn't at that time, I think, cite the

2

rule, but I would at this time cite rule 403 which does

3

talk about the exclusion of evidence that is more

4

prejudicial than probative.

5

The Court denied that or overruled that

6

objection, indicated that Mr. Connelly might actually

7

show the scars to the jury, which, in fact, he did.

8

just wanted to make sure that would be on the record

9

I

THE COURT:

That will be noted.

10 I

MS. REMAL:

Okay, thank you.

11

THE COURT:

Are we ready to proceed?

12

MR. STOTT:

Your Honor, Mr. Connelly will

13

come back, and if I could ask him just another couple of

14

questions is all.

15

THE BAILIFF:

16

THE COURT:

17

THE BAILIFF:

18

Are we ready?

THE COURT:

20

THE BAILIFF:

22
23

Ready for the jury?

Robert,

are you ready?

19

21

Are you ready for the jury?

Yes, we're ready.
Come on in now.

All rise.

(The jury entered the room and was seated.)
May be seated.
THE COURT:

I#d like to just ask the jurors

24

if they had any occasion to be exposed to anything

25

regarding this case outside of this courtroom, or if
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melted into the fabric of the jacket.
find that.

He didn't

That indicated to him that it was not a

contact wound.
The second wound that Mr. Connelly said
that he had, the wound to the head, the wound that
went essentially, from what I can understand, in in
front of his right ear and down the side of his face
and down the side of his neck, down by his clavicle
is where the bullet lodged; that is the bullet they
were able to extract during the surgery.
What he told us happened just before
that is that he was slumped over in the seat to the
right towards the passenger side.

And remember he

kept demonstrating that for us and I kept trying to
specify how far he had slumped over?

And although

you certainly must use your recollection, because
your recollection is what counts, my recollection is
he was slumped over maybe a third of the way.

He

wasn't slumped all the way over so he was lying down
on the passenger seat.

In fact, he said Mr. Quick

was still sitting there at that point.

He was

slumped partly over and yet he received this very
odd angle of a wound, an angle that's really not
consistent at all with him being partly slumped over
like that unless the shooter who is sitting next to
ROBIN KOESTER -- ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICES n A Q0C
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1 J him puts his arm and hand in a very bizarre and
2 I awkward

position

that

couldn't be designed to do

3 J much of anything.
4 I

The third wound he said was the wound to

5 I the abdomen.

Now, you remember Officer Hawk, was

6 J his name, the one that was present during the
7 I surgery until the slug in the neck area was removed
8 J and he said that the abdomen was the first one that
9 I they dealt with, he was there.

And he described the

10 I wounds to us and actually Mr. Connelly demonstrated
11 J the scars to you.

And my recollection is that the

12 I bullet went in somewhere in the upper part or the
13 I middle part of the rib cage area and somewhere below
14 J that breast and then came out somewhere near the
15 I left side in a downward angle,
16 J

Remember what Mr. Connelly told us about

17 I his position when that third shot was fired?

He

18 J told us that by that time Mr. Quick was out of the
19 I car, moving out of the car because Connelly had
20 I taken his own gun out and Quick was afraid of that,
21 I so he's moving out of the car.

And Mr. Connelly,

22 I from the first two shots, is by this time, he says,
23 I basically lying right down on the side of the seat.
24 I Well, you tell me how the bullet when your right
25 I side is lying against the seat is going to go in
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1 I that side and come out the other side.
2 I not physically possible.

It's just

It just doesn't match what

3 I he said.
4 I

Now, he told us some other things.

He

5 I told us that he was shot three times while he was in
6 I the car.

All three times he was in the car.

All

7 J three times the gun was being pointed at him in the
8 J car.

And yet there is two shell casings found in

9 I the car.

We know from the officers who examined the

10 J vehicle at the Wayne's Texaco, they found two in
11 J there.

The third one, however, is Exhibit 16, I

12 I think it is, which is a picture of the car in front
13 I of the Pax Company.

A number of witnesses used this

14 I to demonstrate where they found things.

They talked

15 I about that shell being found about ten feet out from
16 J the curb, is what I remember Officer Snow telling
17 I us, and way back down behind the car.

Now, Mr.

18 I Connelly told us that the car was actually moving
19 J while all of this was going on, that he hadn't
20 I gotten it into gear and it was moving forward.

So

21 I if anything, the third shell casing should be found
22 I inside the car or if outside the car, right by the
23 I passenger door forward from where this picture
24 I shows.

But that's not where that shell casing was

25 I found at all.

It was back here behind the car out
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1 I sense.
2

It would explain why Frank would have a gun

with him.

If you're going in for some fairly high

3 I level drug deal you might have a gun.

It explains

4 I why there's blood and a shell casing outside the car
5 I in a place that Mr. Connelly, at least as far as the
6 I shell casing, can't explain.

It explains why

7 I there's no third bullet found in the car.

All of

8 J that makes sense if you think about Michael's
9 I testimony where he says after he runs off from the
10 I car he looks back and one person is out of the car.
11 J And frankly, he doesn't stick around to find out
12 I what they're doing or where they're headed next,
13 I he's getting out of there as fast as he can.

But it

14 I makes sense that one person gets out of the car and
15 I then the second person gets out of the car and for
16 I whatever reason, they fight over the drugs and/or
17 I the money and Mr. Connelly gets shot.

He gets shot

18 I outside of the car, that's why there's blood outside
19 I the car, that's why the shell casing which comes out
20 I of the gun straight up is outside of the car in the
21 I middle of the street and not inside the car
22 I someplace.
23 I the car.

That's why the bullet is not found in
He didn't get shot in the car, he got shot

24 I out of the car.
25 I

If you think about a third person being
ROBIN KOESTER -- ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICES nnoo7
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1 I in the backseat, it also makes sense about the head
2 I wound, the very odd direction of the bullet path in
3 I the head wound.

It would be exactly what could

4 I happen if someone were in the backseat and they
5 I stood up and were pointing the gun down, which they
6 I could do from the back.

It really makes sense when

7 J you think about it and you put the details together
8 I with what Michael told you.
9 I

It makes sense that the reason they

10 I would be at Pax is because he's familiar with it, he
11 J worked there and that's where he had the drugs.
12 J That all makes sense.

What Mr. Connelly said just

13 J doesn't.
14 I

The police department did what they

15 I could to try and track down what was happening.

But

16 I what they failed to do was investigate anything that
17 I Mr. Connelly said.

They took at face value what he

18 I told you, what he told them.

And Detective Howell

19 I was quite honest about that.

I asked him, did you

20 I do this, did you do that, did you do this?

And I'm

21 I sure you remember, he shrugged his shoulders and
22 I said, well, no, I didn't see any point in doing
23

that.

24 I

He took Mr. Connelly's word that that

25 I was his gun.

That's why he didn't bother to
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almost died.

H e ' s j u s t a normal guy, a normal businessman

2

j

m i n d i n g h i s own P ' s and Q ' s .

3

I

Mr. Quick t h a t was on t r i a l ,

4

And h e ' s n o t on t r i a l .

I t was

and h e was found g u i l t y by a

jury.

And I'd submit that's the way it should stand.

5

THE COURT:

6

I'll allow you to have an

7

opportunity to respond to what he had to say, being the one

8

who made the motion.
MS. REMAL:

9

10
11

Let me just respond in this

manner,
Mr. Stott indicated that since—that it would be a

12

different story if we had a third witness who could come in

13

and say that Mr. Connelly admitted he lied.

14

seems like a distinction without a difference to me.

15

Frankly, that

What difference does it make if we have a person

16

who says that he said something else happened or whether we

17

have a document that says he said something else happened?

18

But the important thing is that we have evidence that he

19

said on another occasion something different happened.

20

I don't see what difference it makes whether that comes

21

from a person or a document, it's still evidence, it's just

22

as good as another source of evidence.

23

THE COURT:

And

In reviewing the arguments

24

that have been made and looking at the document and hearing

25

the testimony of Mr. Connelly, and sort of reviewing in my
34
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mind the testimony that was given during the entire trial,

2

the Court is of the opinion that the motion should be denied

3

i

4

I

at this time.
I think the testimony of both the defendant and

5

Mr. Connelly were critical, but in addition, I think the

6

cumulative evidence that was given at the time of the trial

7

essentially supports the testimony of Mr. Connelly in regards

8

to the events that had taken place and the statements that

9

were essentially made by each of the witnesses support, in

10

my mind, the activities that took place in regards to the

11

defendant, the other witnesses and what finally transpired

12

at the time of the incident of the shooting.
The Court further is of the opinion that in

13
14

Mr. Connelly's testimony, he indicated that this document

15

was not prepared by him, but was sent to him, prepared by

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

someone else.
carefully.

He reviewed it, did not review it very

There are a number of mistakes that were in there

that were not corrected. His explanation was that he would
not have benefited from this particular document, himself,
he does not know why Allied, you know, submitted this, and
what, you know, would .have benefited them.
He indicated that he was not employed as such,
but was still an employee to the extent that he had 30 days
in which to find new employment, which appears to me to be
reasonable.

That people, in many instances, are given some
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1

time to find other employment when they are discharged from

2

their job.

And their primary job is to find another job

3

because of their discharge.

4

unreasonable to me, as far as his explanation is concerned.

And that does not sound

The distinction between this and the James case,

5
6

one was a document with an inconsistent statement and

7

another was an individual w i t h — a third party that came in to

8

testify. I think Mr. Connelly made a reasonable explanation

9

of the difference in regards to the document, which was not

10

prepared by himself, but by another party.
But in reviewing the total case, the Court is of

11
12

the opinion that the outcome would not be different with the

13

additional information that was provided.

14

Mr. Connelly reasonably explained the statements that were

15

made in this application for hearing and the reason why

16

those statements were made and why he did not appreciate

17

the importance of making any changes and the fact that he

18

didn't carefully read this because he was just told to sign

19

this.

20

I believe that

The Court is of the opinion that, I think the

21

important part of this motion is it must be such as to

22

render a different result probable on the retrial of this

23

case, and the Court is of the opinion that the outcome

24

would probably not be different had this matter been

25

brought to the attention of the Court and been heard by the
36
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jury, based on the testimony that's been given and the

2

i

3

I

4

evidence that's been submitted.
MS. REMAL:

from the bench the copy of this transcript.
THE COURT:

5
6

MS. REMAL:
transcript.

g

12
13

The record will

Oh, not this.

This, the

No, the exhibit may stay.
THE COURT:

The transcript, yes.

If there are no further matters, we'll be in

10
11

You may.

show that Exhibit No. 1 has b e e n —

7
8

Your Honor, may I retrieve

recess.
MR. STOTT:

Thank you, your Honor.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

14
15
16

* * *

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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